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Abstract 
This paper examines the Rohingya Muslim experience historically, but perhaps more significantly, 
it examines their experience through a contemporary humanitarian and human rights lens as well. 
Indeed, it begins with a brief history of the Rohingya Muslims in post-colonial Myanmar. The 
second section analyzes contemporary humanitarian developments. The third section explores 
several key human rights abuses perpetrated against the Rohingya Muslims. The final section 
concludes with recommendations. 
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1.1 INTRODUCTION 
More than seventy five percent of the world’s 
population dwells in countries where state 
restrictions on religious freedom prevail1. 
Despite laudable strides towards democratic 
reform, Myanmar is among those nations. In 
fact, it stands out as among the world’s 
twenty-five most populous nations with the 
most government restrictions on, and social 
hostilities due to, religion. Notably, the 
religious hatred or bias is directed toward the 
Rohingya Muslim population2. The United 
Nations has long characterized the Rohingya 
Muslims as one of the world’s most 
persecuted minorities. By way of 
background, anti-Rohingya and anti-Muslim 
sentiment has long tainted the state’s political 
and social spheres3. More recently, escalating 
violence has not only exasperated the 
humanitarian crises confronting the 
Rohingya Muslims, but it also threatens to 
undermine the Burmese transition from one-
party military rule to democratic governance. 
It adversely impacts global security, too. 
1.2 BACKGROUND ON MYANMAR 
Upon achieving independence from England 
in 1948, Myanmar struggled with armed 
ethnic conflict and political instability during 
a prolonged period of political reformation4. 
In 1962, a military coup produced a one-
party, military state informed by socialist 
notions of governance—it would last for 
more than sixty years.9 During that time, the 
Burmese army committed numerous human 
rights abuses, such as killing, raping, and 
torturing the state’s Rohingya Muslim 
population5. Notably, the army subjected the 
group to mass expulsions in 19776 and 19927, 
creating what has been widely viewed as a 
chronic refugee crisis in neighboring 
Bangladesh. Two years later, many of the 
Rohingya were forced to return to Myanmar; 
instances of excessive force by the 
Bangladeshi security forces and the Burmese 
troops (receiving the Rohingya) resulted in 
some deaths. Those Rohingya who returned 
were granted limited rights to movement and 
employment. Thousands remain displaced 
even today, surviving on international 
humanitarian aid while continuing to endure 
brutal repression by state border guards. Such 
repression includes forced conscription to 
perform labor, arbitrary detention, beatings, 
and other mistreatment. 
The human rights and humanitarian condition 
of the Rohingya is further exasperated by 
their official “statelessness.”8 The 
Citizenship Act, enacted in 1982, codified the 
legal exclusion of the Rohingya, presently 
numbering approximately one million, by 
denying the group citizenship rights9. The 
Act officially recognizes 135 “national races” 
that qualify for citizenship. The Rohingya 
Muslims are not included on that list and as 
such are denied the full benefits of citizenship 
on account of what the Burmese government 
has described as their “nonindigenous 
ancestry.” Widespread societal prejudice 
against the group informs the historical (and 
contemporary) lack of political will to repeal 
the law10. 
To be sure, the denial of Burmese citizenship 
has resulted in additional injustices and 
inequalities. Illustrative is a Burmese law—
the Emergency Immigration Act—requiring 
the possession of National Registration 
Certificates by all citizens. As noncitizens, 
however, the Rohingya can only possess 
Foreign Registration Cards, which are 
rejected by a number of schools and 
employers. The government has also 
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restricted their rights to marry, own property, 
and move freely—rights guaranteed to non-
citizens as well as citizens under international 
law11. Human rights violations continue until 
present day notwithstanding a nominally 
civilian Burmese government ushered in by 
popular elections in March 201112. 
1.3 THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF 
ROHINGYA 
At the heart of the debate as currently framed 
by the mainstream international media lies 
the question of citizenship. Since the 
Burmese government and large parts of 
society do not accept the Rohingya as one of 
the countries “national races,” a majority of 
the Muslims living in Rakhine are today de 
facto stateless. They are considered to be 
migrants from Bengal that only settled in 
Myanmar after the first Anglo-Burmese War 
and subsequent British colonialization in 
1824. As such they are not eligible to full 
citizenship according to the 1982 Citizenship 
Act. Those who advocate for a distinct 
Rohingya identity, in return, insist that their 
ancestors have been natives to Rakhine as 
early as the 8th century, wherefore they merit 
recognition as an ethnic group of Myanmar 
and thus deserve full citizenship rights. 
However, in view of the historical evidence 
such a representation of the Rohingya turns 
out more problematic than willingly 
suggested by contemporary Rohingya 
advocates and mainstream international 
media. 
 
 
 
What appears historically verified based on 
the current state of research is the claim that 
Muslims had indeed settled in Arakan (now 
Rakhine) prior to the Burmese conquest in 
1784. But there is no historical evidence 
available, which proves that Muslim 
settlements have existed in Rakhine since the 
8th century. In fact, the earliest historical 
sources mentioning Muslim settlers date back 
to the late 16th century and suggest that they 
had travelled on trading fleets from Bengal to 
Rakhine (Leider 2013). 
To contest the Bengali origin and provide 
prove for a Rohingya ethnic identity, 
Rohingya advocates refer to an article 
published by the British ethnographer Francis 
Hamilton-Buchanan in 1799. He mentioned 
Mohammedans, who have long settled in 
Arakan and who call themselves Rooinga. 
However, in the Chittagonian dialect, which 
the Muslim settlers spoke, the name 
“Rohingya” means nothing but “Rakhine.” 
Given that the name is not mentioned in a 
single other historical source, it seems 
unlikely that the Muslims Hamilton-
Buchanan met referred to a shared Rohingya 
identity. Instead, it appears more convincing 
that they simply stated their place of 
settlement. 
In line with this British testimonies suggest 
that the early Muslim settlers had largely 
assimilated to local Rakhine society and did 
not articulate a separate ethnic or communal 
status. In the 1872 population census the 
British therefore simply recorded them as 
Arakan Muslims (Suaedy & Muhammad 
2015). In other documents they further 
distinguished between Burmese Muslims, 
which referred to those who had inhabited the 
land prior to the arrival of the British, and 
Indian Muslims, sent to support the colonial 
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administration after colonization. A majority 
of Muslims living in Rakhine today are 
descendants of these later migrants from 
Chittagong (Pugh 2013). The large influx of 
new Muslim settlers drastically altered the 
dynamics between the two religious 
communities in Rakhine. Large segments of 
the Buddhist population grew to resent the 
newcomers based on their greater access to 
labor opportunities and British favoritism 
(Cheung 2011). 
With the end of the British Empire also the 
culturally, linguistically and socially inter-
related Muslims of Chittagong and Rakhine 
were separated by international borders. 
Inspired by the independence movement that 
led to the separation of the Islamic Republic 
of Pakistan from India, Muslim settlers in the 
1950s started to advocate for the northern 
part of Rakhine to become an autonomous 
Muslim zone or alternatively merge with East 
Pakistan today Bangladesh (Khin 2016). In 
choosing the name Rohingya, the Muslim 
insurgents known as Muhjahid identified 
themselves with the history and geography of 
Rakhine state and thereby aimed to legitimize 
their fight for autonomy. Against this 
backdrop, the Rohingya, as a distinctive 
group, appear to have their origin first and 
foremost in a political movement that 
emerged from a historical moment of 
separation and since then has been reinforced 
by their shared suffering under the military 
regime. 
Until the military took over control in 1962, 
the Muslim population in Rakhine was not 
only socially better integrated, but also 
enjoyed the same civic rights as the Buddhist 
Rakhines (Cuningham 2015). The junta used 
the political movement of the Rohingya to 
demonstrate that only the military could keep 
the Union of Myanmar together and thereby 
legitimized its own leadership claim. The 
military first stripped the Muslims off their 
legal documents, and then stigmatized them 
as foreigners. De facto stateless more than 
200,000 Muslim Rakhines were violently 
forced into Bangladesh in 1978. After the 
mass exoduses of Muslims in 1978 and again 
in 1991 and 1992, international pressure each 
time persuaded the government of Myanmar 
to allow repatriation of some Muslim 
communities back to Myanmar. However, 
upon the Rohingya’s return the Buddhist 
majority entirely thought of them as Bengalis 
and their living conditions further 
deteriorated. 
When violence escalated between the 
communities in 2012, the military similarly 
spurred tensions to force Aung San Suu Kyi 
to take sides in the conflict. She had just been 
elected into parliament and now faced a 
dilemma: Showing solidarity with the 
Rohingya would equal political suicide in 
Myanmar, especially for her as a member and 
representative of the ruling Bamar ethnicity. 
But internationally her silence was seen as 
indifference and harmed her reputation as a 
human rights defendant. 
1.4 THE ROHINGYA MINORITY 
The Rohingya is an ethnic group living in 
Rakhine State of Myanmar. About 90 percent 
of the 50 million population of Myanmar is 
Buddhist, while the Muslims represent a 
religious minority of just over 4 percent of the 
population. The Rohingya is the largest 
Muslim group in Myanmar, although a 
fraction of the Rohingya are Hindu. The 
Rohingya have suffered longstanding 
marginalization. They have been denied 
Myanmar citizenship and have never been 
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legally recognized in Myanmar as an ethnic 
group13. Many people in Myanmar hold the 
opinion and belief that the Rohingya are 
originally from Bangladesh, while many 
Bangladeshis similarly think that the 
Rohingyas originate from Myanmar. Neither 
Bangladesh nor Myanmar is willing to 
recognize them as citizens. 
Myanmar is a highly ethnically diverse 
country. The Bamar is the largest ethnic 
group and represents a majority of the 
population. Since Myanmar’s independence 
in 1948, the different ethnic minorities have 
been subject to various forms of systematic 
discrimination and deprivation, especially 
since the military coup and seizure of power 
in 1962. Ethnically driven internal armed 
conflicts have been recurring since the 
Myanmar independence14.  
Rakhine State, where the Rohingya in 
Myanmar are concentrated, is found on the 
western coast of Myanmar, bordering the Bay 
of Bengal. To the north, Rakhine State 
borders Bangladesh. Rakhine State is 
characterized by poverty and tension between 
different ethnic and religious groups. The 
Muslim Rohingya population in Rakhine 
State has been estimated to be slightly over 1 
million. The Rakhine Buddhists, estimated to 
be around 2 million, have long harboured 
grievance against the Rohingya, regarding 
them as foreigners with no legitimate claim 
to reside in the state. Beyond the refusal of 
the Myanmar government to grant the 
Rohingya citizenship, the Rohingya have 
been denied access to higher education and 
suffered restrictions in their freedom of 
movement. Land owned by the Rohingya has 
been confiscated, Rohingya males have been 
exploited in forced labour and the Rohingya 
have been required to comply with 
restrictions on the number of children15.  
The recent escalation of the conflict in 
Rakhine State should be seen against the 
background of the increased national 
prevalence of expressions of religious 
intolerance and hatred since 2012, during 
which Muslims have repeatedly been 
portrayed by ultra-nationalist Buddhist 
organizations as a “threat to race and 
religion”. In some instances, politicians have 
even publicly argued in favour of killing the 
Rohingya16.  
1.5 RECENT POLITICAL 
TRANSFORMATION IN MYANMAR 
Myanmar has recently experienced an 
extensive transfer of power from the military 
to the civil society. Open national elections 
were held in November 2015 for the first time 
in 25 years. A civilian government, under the 
leadership of Aung San Suu Kyi, assumed 
power in March 2016. It has, however, been 
pointed out that the political influence of the 
military remains strong through continued 
control of 25 percent of the seats in 
Parliament and the power of the Commander-
in-Chief to appoint key government 
Ministers. 
The new civilian government has stated its 
intention to pursue reconciliation between the 
different ethnic groups of Myanmar. In the 
national elections of November 2015, 
however, Muslim candidates were not 
allowed to participate, resulting in a 
Parliament with no Muslim members. The 
government has also opposed calls to grant 
the Rohingya minority citizenship17.  
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1.6 CURRENT SITUATION IN 
RAKHINE STATE 
The situation in Rakhine State has escalated 
in the aftermath of the 9th of October 2016, 
when insurgents from the Arakan Rohingya 
Salvation Army (ARSA) reportedly attacked 
Myanmar border posts at the Myanmar-
Bangladesh border. Myanmar security forces 
retaliated by conducting what they referred to 
as “area clearance operations”, where they 
claimed to have targeted militant Rohingya 
groups in the northern part of Rakhine State. 
It is still ongoing. The conflict has resulted in 
over 688 000 Rohingya refugees fleeing the 
country18, mostly to Bangladesh, although 
previously, Rohingyas have fled from 
Bangladesh to Myanmar. The access of 
humanitarian organizations in Myanmar has 
simultaneously with the increase of refugees 
been severely limited. Reports of human 
rights abuses in the northern Rakhine State 
have been widespread19. 
According to the Mission report by the Office 
of the High Commissioner, the Myanmar 
security forces in August 2017 began 
operations aimed at expelling the Rohingya 
from Myanmar. The report concluded that the 
operations constituted systematic human 
rights violations and that the perpetrators 
were Myanmar security forces, in many 
instances with collaboration from the local 
population of Rakhine Buddhists. Moreover, 
the report stated that civilian Rohingya were 
intentionally targeted. The findings contest 
the position of the Myanmar government that 
the operations have been targeted at 
Rohingya militants. 
Based on interviews with Rohingya refugees, 
the report detailed features of the ongoing 
persecution. According to the findings, 
Myanmar security forces have engaged in 
indiscriminate violence against Rohingya 
villages, shooting against the inhabitants and 
torching homes. Places of cultural 
significance to the Rohingya population have 
been deliberately destroyed and educated 
members of the communities have been 
arrested and arbitrarily detained. Summary 
executions and sexual violence have also 
been marked features of the ongoing 
persecution. According to the findings, the 
attackers have often stated that the Rohingya 
do not belong in Myanmar. The findings 
confirmed the conclusion of earlier reports 
that severe human rights violations have been 
prevalent in Rakhine State. The actions 
described above are considered crimes 
against humanity, ethnic cleansing, and 
possible genocide according to UN 
definitions. The High Commissioner for 
Human Rights has described the actions of 
the Myanmar security forces as “a textbook 
example of ethnic cleansing”20. 
The leader of the Myanmar Government, 
Aung San Suu Kyi, has denied the allegations 
that Myanmar forces engage in organized 
persecution of the Rohingya minority. She 
has stated that the Myanmar security forces 
have operated with the intent of neutralizing 
Rohingya militants21. On 23 August 2016, the 
Myanmar Government established the 
Advisory Commission on Rakhine State lead 
by former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan 
(the Annan Commission). The task of the 
Annan Commission is to find a solution to the 
situation in Rakhine State22. In November, 
Bangladesh and Myanmar reached a 
principal agreement to enable the return of 
Rohingya refugees from Bangladesh to 
Myanmar23.  
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The agreement has not yet been 
implemented, and several actors – including 
the UNHCR and several states on the 
Security Council – has warned that 
conditions on the ground are not yet safe for 
the return of refugees24. 
1.7 ROLE AND PREVIOUS ACTIONS 
BY THE UNITED NATIONS 
SECURITY COUNCIL 
The Charter of the United Nations gives the 
Security Council the primary responsibility 
for the maintenance of international peace 
and security. In fulfilling this responsibility, 
the Security Council has the authority to take 
military and non-military action to maintain 
or restore international peace and security. 
The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is a 
principle, based on existing international law, 
to prevent and stop genocide, war crimes, 
ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity. The principle was unanimously 
adopted by heads of state and governments at 
the UN World Summit in 2005. 
According to R2P, all member states have a 
duty to prevent and halt genocide and mass 
atrocities. This duty lies first and foremost 
with the state, but the international 
community has a responsibility to assist if the 
state fails to protect its own population. The 
international community also has a 
responsibility to take action if it is the state 
that is responsible for the crimes. The 
principle is divided into three pillars to 
further the implementation of R2P; 
Pillar I: The state bears the primary 
responsibility to protect its populations from 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and 
crimes against humanity. This responsibility 
entails the prevention of such crimes and 
violations, including their incitement; 
Pillar II: The international community has a 
responsibility to assist and encourage the 
state in fulfilling its protection obligations; 
Pillar III: The international community has a 
responsibility to take appropriate diplomatic, 
humanitarian and other peaceful means to 
help protect populations from these crimes. 
The international community must also be 
prepared to take collective action, in a timely 
and decisive manner, in accordance with the 
UN Charter, on a caseby-case basis and in 
cooperation with relevant regional 
organizations, if a state manifestly fails to 
protect its populations or is in fact the 
perpetrator of crimes. Such action may entail 
coercive measures, including the use of force, 
where appropriate, and through the Security 
Council. 
1.7.1 Alternatives to the use of military 
force 
Military force remains a measure of last 
resort. Other measures that the Security 
Council could impose through a resolution 
include arms embargos and economic 
sanctions against Myanmar and against key 
figures. Human rights monitoring and 
humanitarian assistance are other tools. 
Further, the Security Council has the 
authority to refer a criminal investigation to 
the International Criminal Court (ICC). If the 
Security Council uses this authority, the ICC 
has jurisdiction regardless of whether the 
concerned state is party to the court’s Statue. 
1.7.2 Previous actions by the Security 
Council 
Despite reports of the increasing violence and 
repression against rohingyas in Rakhine 
State, the Security Council remained largely 
inactive on the issue during 2016 and the first 
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half of 2017. A few meetings were held on 
the situation under the agenda point “any 
other business”, and no action was taken. In 
the second half of 2017 and beginning of 
2018, the attention devoted to Myanmar and 
Rakhine State increased. Meetings were held 
much more frequently and regularly, and a 
range of briefers, including Secretary-
General António Guterres, updated the 
Security Council on the situation25. 
On 6 November 2017 the Security Council 
issued a unanimous statement inter alia 
condemning the “widespread violence that 
has taken place in Rakhine State” and calling 
on the government of Myanmar to “ensure no 
further excessive use of military force in 
Rakhine State”. Simultaneously, the Security 
Council reaffirmed its “strong commitment 
to the sovereignty, political independence, 
territorial integrity and unity of Myanmar” 
and condemned the attacks carried out by 
ARSA26. The Security Council has, however, 
not adopted any legally binding resolution 
regarding the conflict. 
1.8 SEXUAL AND GENDER-BASED 
VIOLENCE 
Sexual and gender-based violence is 
considered a war crime if it is widespread and 
systematically executed. Hence, it is also a 
reason for the R2P principle to take effect, 
where other member states take action in 
order to ensure the protection of the people. 
According to the Office of the High 
Commissioner, sexual and gender-based 
violence against the Rohingya has been 
prevalent before the current crisis and has 
likely been underreported for decades27. 
When the Office of the High Commissioner 
in January 2017 conducted interviews with 
Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh, more than 
50 percent of the women stated that they had 
experienced rape or other forms of sexual 
violence. Similar findings were reported by 
the Special Representative for Sexual 
Violence in Conflict in December 2017. 
Moreover, the majority of rape victims stated 
that they had been raped by more than one 
perpetrator. The perpetrators were described 
as soldiers28. The conclusions were 
confirmed by the findings of the Office of the 
High Commissioner in subsequent interviews 
with refugees during September 201729.  
The question for the Security Council is how 
sexual and gender-based violence can be 
stopped in this conflict. Furthermore the 
Security Council must consider how this best 
can be achieved, i.e. by enforcing 
accountability, reconciliation and/or 
transitional justice. The resolution should 
urge Myanmar to refrain from organizing, 
facilitating or in any way tolerating sexual 
and gender-based violence in the Rakhine 
State. The Security Council must also address 
concrete measures to ensure an end to these 
acts. 
1.9 RECONCILIATION AND JUSTICE 
A reconciliation process is imperative to 
ensure that the society in Rakhine State will 
function in the future. It is also imperative 
that the perpetrators are brought to justice. 
The reconciliation process should be 
implemented according to the concept of 
transitional justice24 and should aim to 
ensure accountability, serve justice and 
achieve reconciliation. In the resolution, the 
Security Council should address which 
reconciliation mechanisms that can be used 
in this conflict and how the perpetrators 
should be brought to justice. 
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One possible justice mechanism is the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) that can 
prosecute individuals for genocide, crimes 
against humanity and war crimes. ICC has its 
own Statute and is independent of the UN. 
ICC has jurisdiction over crimes committed 
in the territory of a state that is party to the 
Statue or by a national of such a state. 
However, if the Security Council refers a 
situation to the ICC, the court enjoys 
jurisdiction and can investigate the suspected 
crime even if the concerned state is not a 
member of the ICC. As an alternative to ICC 
as a mechanism for justice, reconciliation 
mechanisms such as a truth commission or 
tribunal can be used. 
The government of Myanmar could be urged 
to establish national courts specifically 
tasked with handling cases related to human 
rights violations perpetrated in this conflict. 
1.10 HUMANITARIAN ACCESS 
Humanitarian access refers to the ability by 
neutral humanitarian actors such as NGO’s 
and the UN, to enter a conflict-area and 
provide humanitarian aid as well as monitor 
and promote human rights. In Myanmar, the 
northern Rakhine State has been restricted 
and hundreds of thousands of Rohingya 
remain in the state without any humanitarian 
assistance. In its statement on 6 November 
2017, the Security Council welcomed the 
Government of Myanmar’s ‘decision to 
establish ‘the Union Enterprise Mechanism 
for Humanitarian Assistance, Resettlement, 
and Development in Rakhine’. According to 
the Government of Myanmar, this body shall 
allow both local and international 
organizations to participate in the future 
development of Rakhine State. 
In its resolution, the Security Council should 
address possible mechanisms to ensure that 
humanitarian access is granted and reaches 
the intended receiver. In order to assess the 
actual humanitarian needs, humanitarian 
organizations must firstly be granted access 
to conduct fact-finding missions. 
1.11 CONCLUSION 
The Myanmar Government should grant 
humanitarian access and address the root-
causes of the conflict. In the long-term, this 
involves that the Rohingya are granted 
Myanmar nationality. In the short-term, the 
Rohingya must be granted a legal status and 
civil rights such as the right to education and 
freedom of movement. 
1.12 RECOMMENDATIONS 
 The primary goal of the international 
Rohingya debate and subsequent 
policies should be the improvement 
of the humanitarian crisis in 
Rakhine. From a political point of 
view it is therefore essential to 
acknowledge the complexity of the 
conflict and take into account the 
existing fears within both 
communities. 
 As an important first step in the 
resolution of the conflict, the 
improvement of the Rohingya’s legal 
status matters to guarantee their basic 
civil rights, such as freedom of 
movement and access to government 
services. 
 To reduce such resentments and 
contribute to rebuilding trust 
between the communities, from an 
international donor perspective it is 
therefore essential to accord 
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development aid equally to all 
groups in Rakhine state. 
 In response to the military 
crackdown on Rohingya 
communities following the attacks 
on police stations in October 2016 an 
extreme policy, such as the 
cancellation of urgently needed 
development aid in Rakhine would 
thus be counter-productive. 
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